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Abstract. Under U.S. Bankruptcy Code, equity holders can restructure diﬀerent debt classes
at a time. Recognizing this allows us to endogenize, in continuous time, not only the restruc-
turing threshold but also the restructuring order of senior and junior classes. Unlike previous
studies, sequential restructuring explains absolute priority violation (APV) not just among
debt and equity but also among debt classes. The extent of APV leads to positive credit
spreads even if senior creditors are fully secured and virtually immune to default risk. More-
over, sequential restructuring can lead to reversals in the credit spreads. We provide suﬃcient
conditions for avoiding reversals.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G12, G32, G33.
Key Words: strategic debt service, bankruptcy, Nash Bargaining, debt priority structure,
geometric Brownian motion.
Since Leland’s (1994) seminal work, the valuation of corporate debt has incorporated strategic
considerations during renegotiation. Leland endogenizes the restructuring threshold by allow-
ing the payment of promised coupons through additional equity issues until the equity value
is driven to zero. A piece of literature on strategic bankruptcy, which includes the work of
Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), and Mella-Barral and Peraudin
(1997), explains absolute priority violation (APV) among debt and equity holders. In turn,
APV signiﬁcantly increases credit spreads.
The implications of these studies may be limited when debt restructuring is governed by a
bankruptcy code, however. The role of the bankruptcy code in the allocation of bargaining
power is signiﬁcant in the valuation of renegotiable debt. A few recent studies on strategic
bankruptcy accounting for bargaining power considerations (e.g., Mella-Barral and Perraudin,
1997; Hege and Mella-Barral, 2000; Hege and Mella-Barral, 2002; Fan and Sundaresan, 2000;
Hennessy, Hackbarth and Leland, 2005) incorporate renegotiation by modelling private work-
outs where disagreement generally triggers liquidation and the absolute priority rule. Corporate
debt valuation models of out-of-court renegotiations provide a useful framework to analyze pri-
vate workouts. However, as noted by Brown (1989) in a game-theoretical analysis of Chapter
11, a formal bankruptcy proceeding diﬀers from private workouts in a number of dimensions,
which aﬀect the values of corporate securities.
Yet, very few pricing theories have explicitly addressed the bankruptcy code as a structural
issue in determining credit spreads (Sundaresan, 2000). We attempt to do this by focusing on
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code for corporate restructuring. Our model’s distinctive feature is the
expanded set of strategic actions available to the equity holders under Chapter 11.
†Department of Economics & Related Studies, University of York, ab54@york.ac.uk. We are grateful to Ronald
Anderson, Bart Lambrecht, Lynn LoPucki, William Perraudin, Ron Smith and Simone Varotto for valuable
comments and suggestions. Seminar participants at Birkbeck College, Essex University, ISMA Centre, University
of Copenhagen (FRU 2005) and University of Lugano also provided useful comments.
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Brieﬂy, a Chapter 11 ﬁling includes two essential rules: (i) the equity holders have the
exclusive right to ﬁle a ﬁrst restructuring plan and (ii) those claimholders left ‘unimpaired’
by a plan1 lose their veto power. Therefore, in formal bankruptcy, the equity holders can
renegotiate with one creditor at a time in a sort of ‘private renegotiation’ while excluding
unimpaired creditors. This possibility greatly enhances the equity holders’ strategic behavior in
bankruptcy, which concerns not only the timing of bankruptcy but also whether to restructure
the junior debt, the senior debt, or both. Consistently with empirical evidence2, the set of
strategic actions is further expanded by the possibility of ﬁling for formal renegotiation a
number of times. Therefore, our setting allows for sequential restructuring of diﬀerent debt
classes.
We ﬁnd a unique sequence of equilibrium plans which, depending on the parameters, either
restructures the junior creditor ﬁrst and the senior one later, or vice versa.
In particular, for reasonable level of bankruptcy costs (not excessively high) and junior face
value (not negligibly small), it is more likely that the senior debt is not restructured the ﬁrst
time bankruptcy is triggered and will be restructured only if the ﬁrm value falls below a certain
level, which triggers a new bankruptcy proceeding. This kind of equilibrium is rather common
in Chapter 11 reorganizations where, typically, senior secured classes are left unimpaired or,
when impaired, the impairment involves all classes (see LoPucki, 1993 and LoPucki 2004).
Most important, we ﬁnd that this kind of equilibrium may aggravate APV because, by
delaying renegotiation with the senior creditor (until the ﬁrm value is suﬃciently low), the
equity holders reduce the liquidation threat of the creditor when renegotiation takes place.
In principle, when the ﬁrm liquidation value is high enough, a seniority provision might be
a valuable asset (because senior claims might recover substantial value even if the ﬁrm were
liquidated). However, when the senior creditor is not impaired, seniority is not enforceable
(only impaired classes retain veto power). No matter how valuable collateral might be, it
simply cannot be seized by unimpaired senior classes. Interestingly, while junior classes are
always better oﬀ in renegotiation rather than liquidation, senior classes may perform better
if the ﬁrm were liquidated. In other words, the extent of APV in Chapter 11 may generate
positive renegotiation premia for senior classes (i.e., the claim liquidation value is above its
value in Chapter 11 reorganization).
Also, for suﬃciently low senior face value, renegotiation premia may be 100% of the senior
credit spread. In this case, positive senior credit spreads are fully explained by sequential
renegotiation. This could not be the case in a pure liquidation scenario ` a la Merton (1974),
or under a restructuring system such as the UK Insolvency Law which gives senior creditors
substantial control over the renegotiation process3 (see Gower, 1992).
Violation of the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11 reorganizations has been documented
by a number of studies (among others see Weiss, 1990, Altman, 1991, Fabozzi et al. 1993,
Franks and Torous 1994). In particular, the possibility of positive renegotiation premia to
senior creditors is in line with Bebchuck and Fried (1996) who argue that secured creditors
may receive less than what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Also our result is
in line with Pulvino and Pidot (1997) who ﬁnd that bonds with very high collateral ratios
(which, they argue, should be virtually immune to default risk) yield 160 basis points above
highly-rated bond yields.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that when a plan impairs the senior creditor ﬁrst and the junior one
later on, the senior credit spread may be higher than the junior one. Reversal of the spreads
does not occur if the junior creditor is restructured/impaired before the senior creditor. The
possibility of spread reversal may have some practical relevance in two circumstances.
First, for reasonable level of bankruptcy costs, reversal can occur only for a particularly
low level of junior face value. That is, the reversal is essentially a reversal between very large
claims versus very small unsecured claims. Reversal would be consistent with the treatmentSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 3
of convenience claims (small unsecured claims placed in a separate class for administrative
convenience) which in Chapter 11 reorganizations are often unimpaired.
Second, with respect to large reorganizations, involving more complex priority structures,
it is often the case that low priority classes, such as senior unsecured and junior (or senior
subordinated and junior classes), recover very similar value or junior classes may recover slightly
more than more senior unsecured classes (see Altman and Eberhart, 1994; and Franks and
Torous, 1994). It is beyond the scope of this paper to extend the model to account for more
complex debt structures. However, our predictions are in line with these empirical ﬁndings.
Finally, our in-court restructuring can be a benchmark for out-of-court restructuring. Se-
quential renegotiation justiﬁes the possibility of out-of-court debt forgiveness and strategic
default on a single class of claims. Although debt issues often contain cross default provisions,
this does not generally prevent private workout and strategic default on a single creditor. In-
deed, our equilibrium is consistent with the possibility of out-of-court strategic default on a
single class of claims accommodated by other classes of claimants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the main assumptions about the
value of the ﬁrm when it continues operating and when it is liquidated. Section II sets out the
bankruptcy rules for renegotiation. In Section III, we present a simpler version of the model,
with a single creditor. Section IV describes the model with two classes of debt. In Section
V, we summarize and explain our results. In Section VI, we consider the implications of our
results on the credit spreads. Section VII concludes.
I. Firm value: basic assumptions
The value of the ﬁrm is driven by an underlying cash ﬂow process, pt, which follows a geometric
Brownian motion4 with drift µ and volatility σ. For simplicity, we assume that there are no
variable costs and the scrapping value of the ﬁrm, γ, is constant. Moreover, agents are risk-
neutral5 and fully informed, with a risk-free interest rate r.














where λ is the negative root of the quadratic equation6 r − µλ − σ2
2 λ(λ − 1) = 0 and is equal
to
λ =
−(µ − σ2/2) −
p
(µ − σ2/2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2 . (2)
The value of the ﬁrm is maximized when the threshold level for shutting down, p, is such that





γ(r − µ). (4)
To show that liquidation is generally ineﬃcient as direct bankruptcy costs arise, we assume
that the ﬁrm can be liquidated at any time and sold to a potential new owner who is as
eﬃcient as the original owner. This means that the new owner can generate a value V (pt,p)
by running a pure equity ﬁrm. The liquidation sale of the ﬁrm occurs according to a Nash
bargaining situation between the initial owner (the equity holders) and the new owner, where
the terms of the agreement deﬁne the ﬁrm sale price, say VL(pt), which is therefore the unknown
of the bargaining problem. As is well known, the axiomatic solution to the Nash bargaining
problem can be found by maximizing the “Nash product,” say NP, which is the product of the
diﬀerences between the agreement and disagreement payoﬀ for each player. In our case, the
agreement payoﬀs are: VL(pt) to the initial owner (that is, the sale price agreed on and received4 BRECCIA
by initial owner) and V (pt) − VL(pt) to the new owner7. The disagreement payoﬀs are: γ to
the initial owner (i.e., if no agreement is reached, the ﬁrm is sold piecemeal at its scrapping
value) and zero to the new owner. We do not restrict this bargaining to be symmetric. One
can imagine that the initial owner has a relative bargaining power α ∈ [0,1) and, hence, the
new owner has bargaining power 1 − α. Given these speciﬁcations, the Nash product can be
written as
NP = (VL(pt) − γ)α(V (pt) − VL(pt))1−α
and it can be easily found that the agreed sale price which maximizes the Nash product is
argmaxNP(VL(pt)) = VL(pt) = αV (pt) + (1 − α)γ. (5)
Therefore, from our bargaining formulation, the liquidation value is a weighted average
between V (pt) and γ, and it is always greater or equal to the scrapping value. This speciﬁcation
of liquidation value, VL, partly resembles the formulation by Leland (1994) and Leland and
Toft8 (1996) and it converges to their formulation when the scrapping value is equal to zero.
Also, our formulation of VL is in line with Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) in that their
liquidation value is always below the maximum ﬁrm value V (pt) but never below the scrapping
value of the ﬁrm. Moreover, their bankruptcy costs become zero as the state variable, pt,
approaches the optimal shutting down trigger, which is also conﬁrmed by our bargaining
formulation of VL. Note, our bankruptcy costs is given by the diﬀerence V (pt) − VL(pt),
which rearranges as (1−α)(V (pt)−γ). Hence, the bankruptcy costs converge to zero when pt
tends to the optimal shutting down trigger p.
Furthermore, we assume that the ﬁrm has issued a perpetual debt with face value F. The
debt is allocated over two classes of claims–a senior and a junior claim with face values respec-
tively Fs = bs/r and Fj = bj/r (and Fs +Fj = F) where bs and bj are the contractual coupon
payments. Also, to make the problem interesting, we assume that the senior claim face value
is such that9 Fs > γ.
II. Bankruptcy rules
Financial distress is often accompanied by formal renegotiations and rarely by liquidations.
As reported by Franks and Torous (1989), after the introduction of the 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy
Act, the number of ﬁrms seeking bankruptcy protection has increased tremendously.
The Bankruptcy Code has been amended a number of times, with most recent amend-
ments set out with “The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005” (shortly, the 2005 Act) eﬀective since October 17, 2005. Below, we stylize Chapter 11
rules by setting out our main assumptions on the formal bankruptcy process10. The 2005 Act
does not have any impact on our setting, however.
1. Timing of bankruptcy. As in the strategic bankruptcy literature (e.g., Leland, 1994,
Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997) and consistently with Chapter 11, we assume that the
ﬁrm can voluntarily enter bankruptcy by ceasing to pay the contractual coupon11. Strategic
bankruptcy implies that the equity holders are free to issue new equity to cover operating
losses. As soon as the ﬁrm stops meeting its contractual obligation a formal renegotiation
procedure is triggered.
2. First proposal and impairment rule. Following Chapter 11, we assume that the equity
holders have an exclusive right to propose a ﬁrst reorganization plan12, which must be approved
by all claimants. Precisely, in Chapter 11, approval of two-thirds majority within each class
is required, but to keep the bargaining simple and abstract from holdout problems, we treat
each class of claimants as a single agent.
Also as in Chapter 11, we assume that a creditor cannot reject a plan if he receives cash equal
to the face value of his claim or if the plan calls for no scaling down of the coupon paymentSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 5
scheduled in the existing contract. In this case the creditor is said to be unimpaired13 by the
plan and loses his veto power14. The ‘impairment’ rule allows equity holders to negotiate with
one creditor at a time.
In other words, at this ﬁrst stage of renegotiation, the equity holders have the right to make
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, which impairs one or both creditors. If this oﬀer is accepted by the
impaired creditors (the unimpaired ones lose veto power), the plan is conﬁrmed, the game ends
and restructuring proceeds. This initial stage is referred to as ‘private game’.
Note that, we have implicitly assumed that only consensual plans (i.e. plans accepted by
impaired creditors) are conﬁrmed. However, in principle, Chapter 11 allows for conﬁrmation
by the Court of non-consensual plans. That is, on request of the plan’s proponent, the Court
may conﬁrm a plan in spite of rejection of some impaired classes as long as: i) at least one
impaired class has accepted the plan and ii) impaired rejecting classes receive at least what they
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation15. As reported by Lopucki and Whitford (1990), non-
consensual plans –so called ‘crammed-down’ plans– are rarely the outcome of restructuring (in
a sample of 43 Chapter 11 reorganizations, in no case was a plan conﬁrmed without approval of
all debt classes). Not even seems cram-down to be a strategic threat to speed up acceptance of
a plan. According to Lopucki and Whitford, bankruptcy practitioners rarely suggest a cram-
down strategy. Rather than for strategic reason, they argue that cram-down is accounted for
in Chapter 11 because when a class receives nothing under a plan, that class is deemed to
reject –even if no actual disagreement arises– and no vote from that class is taken (Bankruptcy
Code, Section 1126, Paragraph (g)). Hence, in such a scenario, cram-down is necessary as a
practical expedient to avoid non-conﬁrmation of plans which are unanimously agreed on.
3. Subsequent proposals. We assume that without time delay16, if the ﬁrst proposal is
rejected, the renegotiation moves to a second stage in which any player may ﬁle competing
plans.
There are no speciﬁc agenda rules concerning subsequent proposals in the bankruptcy code.
Once the equity holders’ proposal has been rejected, the ‘rules’ of the game become unbiased
toward diﬀerent players. In Chapter 11, when multiple plans are ﬁled and accepted by the
voting classes, the Court should decide which plan to conﬁrm on the ground of ‘the preferences
of creditors and equity security holders’ (Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (c)). A
certain degree of discretion seems to be granted at this stage and the outcome of the negotiation
depends on the ability of the players to propose reorganization plans and inﬂuence the court.
There are many diﬀerent ways of modeling the second stage of the renegotiation17. Unlike
Brown (1989), we recognize the limits of a ‘refereed’ bargaining system. As argued by legal
scholars, judicial discretion is granted in many circumstances (see A. Schwartz, 2002). There-
fore, our bargaining setting accounts for exogenous asymmetries between parties which might
reﬂect the ability of claimholders to inﬂuence the court. As with Welch (1997), such asymmetry
can be explained as a reﬂection of diﬀerent organization skills and reputation beneﬁts18.
We use a simple framework that highlights the bargaining power of the diﬀerent players and,
as with Fan and Sundaresan (2000), we assume that a Nash axiomatic solution is enforced by
the court19. Therefore, players split the gains generated from restructuring according to their
bargaining power. Also, in line with Aivazian and Callen (1983) a cooperative approach seems
to best ﬁt a formal renegotiation supervised by the Court. Moreover, the Nash axiomatic
approach is easy to handle, extends unchanged to multilateral bargaining situations. When
it is believed that there are no asymmetries at this stage of the negotiation process, then the
bargaining power of players can be simply set equal to 1/3.
If no agreement is reached at this stage, the ﬁrm goes into liquidation without delay; there-
fore, the disagreement payoﬀs in the Nash bargaining correspond to the liquidation payoﬀ of
each claimant.6 BRECCIA
More formally, let i = e,s,j denote the equity holders (the senior and the junior creditor)
respectively. As is well known20, in the Nash axiomatic bargaining, player ‘i’ can guarantee her
disagreement payoﬀ (i.e., liquidation payoﬀ), Li, plus a share of the surplus, V (pt) − VL(pt),
which depends on the relative bargaining power. Therefore, in the Nash bargaining, player ‘i”s
claim value is equal to
Pi = ξi(V (pt) − VL(pt)) + Li, (6)
where ξi and Li denote the bargaining power and the liquidation payoﬀ of player ‘i’ respectively.
We will refer to this stage as the ‘joint game’.
4. Liquidation. If the ﬁrm is liquidated, the absolute priority rule (APR) applies. Formally,
under the APR, the liquidation payoﬀs for s, j and e are respectively
Ls = min{Fs,VL} (7)
Lj = min{Fj,VL − Ls} (8)
Le = max{VL − Ls − Lj,0}. (9)
5. Terms of Contracts and Enforceability. In practice, the renegotiation can be imple-
mented by reducing coupon payments while the ﬁrm is in a default region through a variable,
state contingent, debt service ﬂow as in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (MBP) (1997). Therefore
we focus on restructuring plans which consist of piecewise right-continuous service ﬂow func-
tion of the state variable pt, denoted as bi(pt) for i = s,j with bi(pt) ≤ bi (the equality holds
if class i is unimpaired under the plan).
Because the equity holders cannot commit to remaining out of bankruptcy and can trigger
renegotiation at any time, creditors will underwrite a state contingent contract only if this is
self-enforceable on the equity side (in the sense that the equity holders will not have incentive
to deviate). It is reasonable, then, to imagine that players bargain over short-term contracts,
i.e., instantaneous payoﬀs, and that they can renegotiate continuously. Though this might
not be realistic, a continuous time renegotiation provides the necessary benchmark to derive a
self-enforceable contract.
Let the set of plans proposed by the equity holders in the “private game” be P = {Pe,Pj,Ps :
Pe +Pj +Ps = V (pt)}. At the second stage, “joint game,” each player can guarantee a payoﬀ,
denoted as Pi for i = e,j,s which depends on the bargaining strength of players. Therefore, a
reorganization plan will be accepted at the ﬁrst round by an ‘impaired claimant,’ denoted by
‘i,’ only if Pi ≥ Pi.
Panel A shows the two-step game in which, at the ﬁrst round, the equity holders choose
whether to impair:(i) the junior creditors by proposing a plan Pj ⊂ P where Pj = {Pe,Pj,Ps :
Pe ≥ Pe,Pj ≥ Pj,Ps < Ps}, (ii) the senior creditor by proposing a plan Ps ⊂ P where
Ps = {Pe,Pj,Ps : Pe ≥ Pe,Pj < Pj,Ps ≥ Ps} or (iii) both the senior and the junior creditors
and in this case the only feasible plan, say Ps,j ⊂ P, must guarantee that each player receives
his reservation payoﬀ in the joint game, i.e. Ps,j = {Pe,Pj,Ps : Pe = Pe,Pj = Pj,Ps = Ps}.
Panel A: Bankruptcy game
Private game Joint game Liquidation
r r rSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 7
e oﬀers:
Pj impairing j,


















i = e,j,s and P
Li = VL
III. A simpliﬁed scenario: one creditor only
We begin by considering a simpliﬁed scenario in which the ﬁrm has issued only one class of
claims, with face value Fc = bc/r > γ. At the end of this section, we show that this scenario
can also be interpreted as an hypothetical situation where a ﬁrm, with diﬀerent classes of
claims (with overall face value Fc), is not allowed to restructure claims sequentially, but only
all classes at once.
With only one creditor, the private game is redundant of course as well as the option to
impair certain classes. Hence, most of Chapter 11’s rules do not play a crucial role in this case.
In fact, most of the literature on debt restructuring focuses on private workouts when there is
a single class of claims rather than on formal bankruptcy. In our formal bankruptcy setting,
renegotiation simply resolves in a Nash bargaining. In fact, given the equilibrium partition in
the joint game, (i) the claim holder accepts the ﬁrst equity holders’ proposal only if he receives
at least the equilibrium share of the joint game and (ii) the equity holders will oﬀer at most
the creditor’s equilibrium share of the joint game. Because there is no time delay between the
private and joint game, the equilibrium shares in the private and the joint game are the same.
Hypothesis 1A. Assume that there exists a trigger strategy, such that when the state variable
pt crosses a certain trigger, say pc, the equity holders renegotiate with the debt holder in a
Nash bargaining (through a service ﬂow bc(pt) < bc).
The equity holders’s objective is to maximize the equity value, therefore the threshold level pc




st. E(pt,pc) = V (pt) − C(pt,pc)
C < Fc,
where C(pt,pc) is the debt value for pt ≥ pc.
Hypothesis 2A. When the state variable is in the range [p,pc] we assume that VL < Fc.
Because APR applies, this implies that Le = 0 and Lc = VL.
Renegotiation unfolds through a Nash bargaining where, by equation (6) and Hypothesis
2A, the shares to the equity holders and the creditor become respectively
Pe = ξe(V − VL) (11)
Pc = ξc(V − VL) + VL (12)
with

ξi ∈ [0,1] P
i ξi = 1 for i = e,c.
Because the renegotiated shares are already deﬁned by equations (11) and (12), left to
determine are the trigger pc and the service ﬂow bc(pt).8 BRECCIA
To derive the bankruptcy trigger pc, one can solve the equity holders’ maximization problem,




st. C < Fc
with C(pt) = Pc for pt = pc



















bc/r − γ(1 − αξc)
αξc
(r − µ), (15)
with
αξc = ξc(1 − α) + α. (16)
Moreover, as shown in Appendix, the trigger p∗
c guarantees that Hypothesis 2A holds (because
of the similarity in the calculation, we prove this along the proof of Hypothesis A in Appendix).
Last, the service ﬂow function bc(pt) can be derived as follows. Under risk neutrality, the
claim value C(pt) is free of arbitrage opportunity if and only if bc(pt) solves the diﬀerential
equation21






bc(pt) = bc if pt ∈ (p∗
c,∞)
bc(pt) < bc if pt ∈ [p,p∗
c]









(i.e., continuity in level and ﬁrst derivative) and ii) the no-bubbles conditions Pc(p) = γ and
limpt→∞ C(pt) = bc
r .
One can ﬁnd that the debt value, C(pt), deﬁned by equation (14), satisﬁes all the above
conditions. In particular, equation (14) is continuous in level and satisﬁes the no-bubble
conditions by construction. Also, continuity in the ﬁrst derivative is guaranteed by the ﬁrst
order condition of the equity holders’ maximization problem, that is, ∂C(pt,pc)/∂pc = 0.
Substituting for C0 and C00 into equation (17) delivers the unique solution, bc(pt), given by
bc(pt) =

bc if pt ∈ (p∗
c,∞)
αξcpt + (1 − αξc)rγ if pt ∈ [p,p∗
c]
with αξc deﬁned in equation (16).
Most important, one can interpret this ‘simpliﬁed scenario’ as a benchmark where a ﬁrm
with two classes of debt (a senior and a junior class with total face value Fc = Fs+Fj) can only
restructure all claims at once (that is, sequential restructuring is not allowed and renegotiation
starts with the joint game). In this case, the debt value C is the sum of senior and junior
debt values (S and J respectively, therefore C = S +J) and equation (12) represents the sum
of the senior and junior shares in the Nash bargaining (Ps and Pj respectively) as deﬁned in
equation 6 (with ξc = ξs + ξj).
An important diﬀerence from the case of a single creditor is the following. While Hypothesis
2A always holds (VL < Fc) at pt ≤ pc, it is not guaranteed that also VL < Fs at pc. That
is, depending on the allocation of face value among creditors it could well be the case that
Fs ≤ VL(pc) < Fc (intuitively, note that pc, and in turn VL(pc), depend on the overall faceSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 9
value Fc and not on the allocation among Fs and Fj). The point is that, if the debt structure is
such that Fs ≤ VL(pc), renegotiating only via temporary reduction of coupon payments is not
feasible because the senior creditor can guarantee a renegotiated value Ps = ξs(V − VL) + Fs
which is greater than his face value. We do not attempt to solve this problem, however it is
clear that a senior debt value Ps > Fs can only be attained by proposing a new debt contract
– e.g., new face value and temporary concessions (see Mella-Barral (1999))– rather than only
temporary state contingent concessions bs(pt) < bs.
As shown below, when instead sequential restructuring is allowed, as in Chapter 11, debt
classes can always be restructured through temporary reduction of cash ﬂow claims22.
IV. Sequential restructuring with two creditors
Our model shows how renegotiation is implemented when the ﬁrm has issued two classes of
claims as deﬁned in Section I. In this scenario, none of the bankruptcy rules described in
Section II are redundant. On the contrary, our bankruptcy framework deﬁnes a unique equi-
librium in terms of renegotiating strategy and restructuring plan.
Hypothesis 1 Assume that there exists a strategy in terms of stopping times, such that
(i) when the state variable pt crosses a certain trigger, say pj, the equity holders start rene-
gotiating with the junior creditor while pt < pj (by proposing a service ﬂow bj(pt) < bj), and
(ii) when pt crosses the trigger ps they start renegotiating with the senior creditor (through a
service ﬂow bs(pt) < bs).
Now, let max{pj,ps} = p∗ and min{pj,ps} = p∗. The equity holders’ strategy can be shortly
summarized as follows:
when p∗ < pt ≤ p∗ propose plan Pi, bi(pt) with

i = j if p∗ = pj
i = s otherwise (18)









st. E(pt) = V (pt) − S(pt,ps,pj) − J(pt,pj,ps)
S < Fs
J < Fj,
where E(pt), S(pt) and J(pt) denotes the values of equity, senior and junior debt and Fs, Fj
are the face values.
Hypothesis 2 We assume that VL < Fs when the state variable is in the range [p,ps]. As
absolute priority applies, this implies that Le = 0,Lj = 0 and Ls = VL, therefore the shares in
the joint game will be
Pe = ξe(V − VL) (22)
Pj = ξj(V − VL) (23)
Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL (24)
with

ξi ∈ I = [0,1] P
i ξi = 1 for i = e,j,s.10 BRECCIA
A. Equilibrium oﬀers and trigger strategy
Next we determine the equilibrium values, E, J, and S, and the optimal trigger strategy
{pj,ps}. We already know, by equations (22)-(24), the values of equity, senior,and junior claims
when23 p ≤ pt ≤ p∗; therefore, the problem is to determine E, J, and S when p∗ < pt ≤ p∗.
As shown in the following proposition, we characterize an impaired claim value under an
accepted oﬀer from the equity holders in the private game.
Proposition 1. When p∗ < pt ≤ p∗, the smallest oﬀer by the equity holders to the junior
creditor is accepted if and only if J(pt,pj) + S(pt,ps) = Pj + Ps.
Proof Let us deﬁne an arbitrage strategy. In the private game, when p∗ < pt ≤ p∗, after
an equity holders’ oﬀer, the impaired creditor can: 1) buy the unimpaired claim at S(pt,ps)
or J(pt,pj), 2) reject the equity holders’ plan (therefore losing J(pt,ps) or S(pt,ps)), and 3)
before the joint game starts, sell the unimpaired claim at Ps(pt) or Pj(pt). The payoﬀ from
such a strategy, say Π, is given by
Π = Pj + Ps − J(pt,pj) − S(pt,ps). (25)
Therefore, an oﬀer from the equity holders is accepted by an impaired creditor, if and only if
Π ≤ 0, that is J(pt,ps) + S(pt,ps) ≥ Pj + Ps. Also, as shown in Appendix, Π ≥ 0 under an
equity holders’ proposal. Then we conclude that the smallest oﬀer which is accepted by the
impaired creditor must be such that Π = 0, which yields
J(pt,pj) + S(pt,ps) = Pj + Ps. (26)

Now we can ﬁnd the triggers pj and ps under two possible strategies: CASE A) ps < pj,
i.e. the equity holders impair the junior ﬁrst, or CASE B) ps ≥ pj, the senior creditor is
impaired ﬁrst (if ps > pj) or jointly with the junior creditor (for ps = pj). Then, we show that
a unique equilibrium strategy exists.
CASE A: ps < pj. The equity holders impair the junior creditor only, when ps < pt ≤ pj,
and also the senior creditor when p < pt ≤ ps.
The triggers ps and pj can be derived by working backward. When pt is greater than ps,



















bs/r − γ(1 − αξs)
αξs
(r − µ), (28)
with
αξs = ξs(1 − α) + α. (29)
Then, minimising the junior value with respect to pj, which, by equation (26) (Proposition 1)
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(bs + bj)/r − γ(1 − αξs,j)
αξs,j
(r − µ), (31)
with
αξs,j = (ξs + ξj)(1 − α) + α. (32)
CASE B: ps ≥ pj. The equity holders impair the senior creditor only, when pj < pt ≤ ps,
and also the junior creditor when p < pt ≤ pj.
As before, by working backward, one can ﬁnd pj ﬁrst and then ps. Minimizing the junior



















bj/r + γξj(1 − α)
ξj(1 − α)
(r − µ). (34)
Then, by minimizing the senior value with respect to ps, which (by equation (26) –Proposition




















(bs + bj)/r − γ(1 − αξs,j)
αξs,j
(r − µ), (36)
with αξs,j deﬁned in equation (32).
B. Unique Equilibrium strategy
The equilibrium strategy is unique if, once the equity holders impair creditor i = s or j (leaving
creditor i 6= i unimpaired), they will not change strategy in the future (that is, impairing i 6= i
and paying the full contractual coupon to creditor i).
Regardless of the fact that the creditor who is impaired ﬁrst is the junior (as in CASE A) or
the senior one (CASE B), the higher bankruptcy trigger does not change. In fact, p∗
j1 = p∗
s1.
Let us denote with ¯ p the trigger p∗
j1 = p∗
s1. One can ﬁnd, by some simple algebra, that
p∗




ξj(1−α) > F − γ
p∗




ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ.
(37)
These two inequalities allow us to state an important result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal impairment strategy is unique and the equity holders restructure














ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ.
(38)
Proof When p∗




ξj(1−α) > F −γ) is also true that p∗
j2 > ¯ p, but p∗
j2 is an optimal
trigger only if p∗
j2 ≤ p∗
s1 = ¯ p. Therefore, we can conclude that p∗
j2 does not exist in this case12 BRECCIA
and hence there is a unique strategy left, that is {p∗
j1,p∗
s2}. Under this strategy the equity






ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ then p∗
j2 ≤ ¯ p and p∗
s2 > ¯ p. Nevertheless, for p∗
s2 to be optimal
it must be the case that p∗
s2 ≤ p∗
j1 = ¯ p. As with the previous case, we conclude that p∗
s2
does not exist and there is only one strategy left corresponding to {p∗
j2,p∗
s1}. Therefore, the
equity holders impair the senior creditor ﬁrst (i.e., when pt = ¯ p) and, when pt = p∗
j2, the junior
creditor also. 





holds, that is VL(ps) < Fs (with ps equal to either p∗
s2 or p∗
s1). Unlike the case depicted in
Section III where only joint restructuring is allowed, this guarantees that the senior creditor is
not involved in the restructuring when he could guarantee his full face value in liquidation.
Comparing sequential renegotiation with joint renegotiation (depicted in Section III), even
though the overall debt value and the higher threshold ¯ p are the same under both restructuring
systems25, however, the valuation of individual debt classes under the two systems diﬀers
substantially. We will discuss this point more extensively in Section VI.
Finally, the existence of a unique equilibrium in formal bankruptcy provides players’ reser-
vation payoﬀs in private workouts. As formal bankruptcy is obviously a benchmark for out-
of-court restructuring, one may note that single-debt-class restructuring is consistent with the
fact that private workouts are often targeted to single classes of claims, and that cross default
provisions do not prevent a private renegotiation. In this regard, it is worth to mention that
in formal bankruptcy, if a plan of reorganization is conﬁrmed, even if a cross-default can be
asserted, conﬁrmation of the plan resolves and eliminates it. That is, when non-impaired debt
contains cross-default provisions, cure of the cross-defaults can be accomplished even if other
classes are impaired under the plan (see in In re: Mirant Corporation, et al., Bankruptcy
Court, Northern District of Texas, case n. 03-46590-DML-11, 2005). This point is obvious
because it would be inconsistent with the purposes of Chapter 11 to allow cross-defaults to
defeat conﬁrmation.
C. Restructuring plan






ξj(1−α) ≤ F − γ) or {p∗
j2,p∗
s1} (if else) with corresponding equilibrium values, J(pt) and
S(pt), deﬁned in CASE A and CASE B (of Section A) respectively. Therefore, according to
the two possible sets of parameters, two corresponding restructuring plans are deﬁned in the
following propositions. Our derivation of the debt service ﬂow functions follows the same line
as the derivation of bc(pt) in Section III. Therefore, we only present our results and refer the





ξj(1−α) > F −γ the equilibrium restructuring plans impair the junior and
senior creditor according to the service ﬂow functions






αξspt + (1 − αξs)γr for pt ≤ p∗
s2
(40)
with αξs,j and αξs deﬁned by equations (32) and (29) respectively.





ξj(1−α)) ≤ F − γ the equilibrium restructuring plans impair the junior
and senior creditor according to the service ﬂow functions






ξj(1 − α)(pt − γr) for pt ≤ p∗
j2
(42)
Proof See Appendix. 
V. Summary
A) Timing of bankruptcy and impairment strategy. The equity holders trigger bank-
ruptcy and ﬁle a plan Pi or Ps,j according to the following equilibrium strategy:
when p∗
i2 < pt ≤ ¯ p ﬁle plan P6=i, with
(




ξj(1−α) > F − γ
i = j otherwise
(43)
when p ≤ pt ≤ p∗






Fs − γ(1 − αξs)
αξs





Fj + γξj(1 − α)
ξj(1 − α)
(r − µ), (46)





F − γ(1 − αξs,j)
αξs,j
(r − µ), (47)
and
αξs = ξs(1 − α) + α, (48)
αξs,j = (ξs + ξj)(1 − α) + α. (49)
Given the overall face value of the debt, F, the higher bankruptcy trigger is independent of the
priority structure of claims. Bankruptcy is triggered the ﬁrst time, as soon as the state variable
crosses the threshold level ¯ p. In other words, given the overall creditors’ bargaining power and
the face value F, the default region [p, ¯ p] is independent of the type of creditor impaired ﬁrst
and is not aﬀected by the allocation of debt among creditors. To highlight the irrelevance of
the debt priority structure over the default region, one can compare two ﬁrms which diﬀer only
in their debt allocation. Imagine, for instance, the limiting case of an identical ﬁrm (where the
equity holders have the same bargaining power, ξe) with just one creditor with a claim of face
value F = Fj + Fs and bargaining power ξc = 1 − ξe = 1 − ξs − ξj. As shown in Section III,
renegotiation starts when pt crosses λ
λ−1
F−γ(1−αξc)
αξc (r − µ) which coincides with the optimal
trigger ¯ p (because αξc = αξs,j).
Therefore, what deﬁnes the default region is the level – not the allocation – of F and
the overall bargaining power of creditors vis-a-vis the equity holders. The higher F and/or
ξe = 1 − ξj − ξs, the earlier bankruptcy occurs.
Given the overall face value, the priority structure of claims determines the default regions
of each single claim. In particular, depending on the claims face values, there are two possible
default regions for each debt class: (i) [p, ¯ p] and [p,p∗














ξj(1−α) = F − γ, p∗
j2 = p∗
s2 = ¯ p, that is claims are jointly impaired and the two default
regions are the same.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The equity holders always start renegotiating
as soon as pt falls below ¯ p. When the state variable crosses this trigger, they would beneﬁt
from reducing coupon payments to the creditor whose face value is relatively high compared
to the overall face value F. Therefore, for instance, given F, if, bj/r is high enough, the
equity holders would beneﬁt from impairing the junior creditor ﬁrst. However, the beneﬁt of
impairing the creditor with higher face value must be weighed against the ‘strength’ of that
creditor at the negotiating table; that is, the ability to extract a valuable package of concessions
in renegotiation. This depends on the liquidation value of the ﬁrm, the priority of the claim, and
the creditor’s bargaining power. The higher α and γ, the bigger the liquidation value, which,
in turn, strengthens the bargaining position of the senior creditor while weakening that of the
junior creditor26. Therefore, when the liquidation value is suﬃciently high, the equity holders
impair the junior creditor, who can extract smaller concessions than the senior claimant. The
argument is similar when the bargaining power of the junior creditor is suﬃciently small. If
this is the case, again, the equity holders impair ﬁrst the junior creditor, that is, the ‘weak’




ξj(1−α) R F − γ, which determines




ξj(1−α) > F − γ
(and hence the junior creditor is impaired ﬁrst) for high levels of bj/r, α and γ and low level
of ξj, consistent with our explanation.












where xs and xj measure the intensity of the eﬀective bargaining strength of the senior and
junior creditor respectively. The terms αξs and ξj(1 − α) represent the eﬀective bargaining
strength of creditors (because they account for the exogenous bargaining power, ξi, and α,
which determines the disagreement/liquidation payoﬀ). Moreover, in equation (50), the eﬀec-
tive bargaining strength is measured in units of unsecured face value (that is, Fs − γ and Fj).
We conclude that the equity holders impair ﬁrst the creditor with lower intensity of eﬀective
bargaining strength.
B) Equity and claims values. According to the trigger strategy in equation (50), if xj < xs,














if pt > p∗
s2

















if pt > ¯ p
Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) − S(pt) if p∗
s2 < pt ≤ ¯ p
Pj(pt) if pt ≤ p∗
s2
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if pt > ¯ p
Pj(pt) + Ps(pt) − J(pt) if p∗
j2 < pt ≤ ¯ p

















if pt > p∗
j2




Pe = ξe(V − VL) (55)
Pj = ξj(V − VL) (56)
Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL. (57)
If xs = xj, all debt classes are restructured at once and debt-holders guarantee their Nash
bargaining outcome Ps and Pj. Figures 2 shows the equilibrium claim values resulting from
three alternative scenarios where the senior creditor is impaired ﬁrst (in Panel A), jointly
(Panel B) or after the junior has been impaired (Panel C).
Given the creditors’ bargaining power ξs + ξj and the face value F, the priority structure
of claims does not aﬀect the equity value. The debt value, S(pt) + J(pt), remains the same
regardless of the allocation of face value among creditors. This result is consistent with MBP
(1997) in that the equity value is aﬀected by the overall face value and the bargaining power of
the equity holder. Moreover, it extends MBP results to a multiple creditors scenario, in that
the allocation of debt among classes is irrelevant.
Furthermore, by preventing ineﬃcient liquidation, strategic debt service eliminates direct
bankruptcy costs. This result is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller theorem in terms of
irrelevance of the debt priority structure.
Further analytical results, directly related to the equilibrium claim values, are provided
in Section VI where we investigate the implication of sequential restructuring on the credit
spreads.
C) Restructuring plan. The equity holders ﬁle either a restructuring plan Pj or a plan
Ps, depending on the level of our parameters. After impairing either class of claims they will
propose an equilibrium plan Ps,j.
The plan Pj consists of a promise to pay the following coupon ﬂows:

bj(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1 − αξs,j)γr − bs
bs
⇒ for pt ≤ ¯ p (58)
which impairs the junior creditor while leaving unchanged the contractual coupon to the senior.
When instead the equity holders ﬁle a plan Ps they promise to pay the pair of coupon ﬂows

bj
bs(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1 − αξs,j)γr − bj
⇒ for pt ≤ ¯ p (59)
which impairs the senior creditor without rescheduling payments for the junior claimant.
After impairing only one creditor by ﬁling a plan Pj or Ps, the equity holders ﬁle a plan
Ps,j which consists of a pair of debt service ﬂow functions:

bj(pt) = ξj(1 − α)(pt − rγ)
bs(pt) = αξspt + (1 − αξs)γr ⇒ for pt ≤

p∗
s2 if Pj has been ﬁled
p∗
j2 else (60)
This equilibrium plan impairs both creditors at once.16 BRECCIA
The three possible pairs of debt service ﬂow functions are shown in Figure 2, where the
senior debt is restructured ﬁrst (Panel A1), jointly (Panel B1) or after the junior has been
restructured (Panel C1).
VI. Implications on credit spreads and APV
A. APV and Renegotiation Premia
The opportunity to reschedule claims sequentially allows the equity holders to delay renegoti-
ation with the ‘strong’ creditor until the ﬁrm value is suﬃciently low and hence the liquidation
threat less eﬀective. In principle, seniority strengthens the position of a creditor at the negotiat-
ing table. In particular, when bankruptcy costs and ﬁrm’s scrapping value are high. However,
when the senior creditor is a tough renegotiator (with high intensity of eﬀective bargaining
power), the equity holders do not restructure her claim and renegotiate vis a vis the junior
creditor. That is, if a claim seniority is a potentially valuable asset, in practice it becomes not
enforceable at the ﬁrst (highest) bankruptcy threshold. Therefore, sequential restructuring
may aggravate APV compared to a restructuring system where senior creditors retain veto
power at any stage of the renegotiation. The additional APV may be simply measured by the
diﬀerence η = Min{Ps,Fs}−S where Ps is the claim value were debt classes restructured all
at once. Interestingly, some simple algebra can show that the sign of η depends on the order
in which claims are restructured. We highlight this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If the senior claim is not restructured ﬁrst, the diﬀerence η(pt) is positive
for pt ∈ (ps2, ¯ p] and sequential restructuring aggravate APV. If instead the senior claim is
restructured ﬁrst, then η(pt) is negative for pt ≤ ¯ p and sequential restructuring reduces APV.
When all classes are restructured jointly: η(pt) = 0 for pt ≤ ¯ p.
Proof In the private game, an impaired creditor accepts a plan which guarantees him
at least with his Nash bargaining share in the joint game. Therefore, if the junior claim is
restructured ﬁrst, for pt ∈ (ps2, ¯ p], the value of the junior debt is such that J > Pj. Also,
by Proposition 1 J = Ps + Pj − S. Therefore, Ps + Pj − S > Pj, that is, Ps − S > 0 and
Pj − J < 0. If instead the senior claim is restructured ﬁrst, by a symmetric reasoning, it will
be Ps − S < 0 and Pj − J > 0. 
Proposition 5 conﬁrms our previous intuition: when senior classes are left unimpaired, se-
niority is not enforceable. Therefore, senior creditor with higher intensity of eﬀective bargaining
power suﬀers stronger APV under Chapter 11.
The impossibility of enforcing seniority and the resulting additional APV has substantial
impact on renegotiation premia and hence on the spreads. The percentage contribution of





During restructuring, if a creditor can exercise his outside option via liquidation, one should
expect the renegotiation premium to be negative. That is, the possibility of rescheduling debt
should reduce the spreads during restructuring. In sequential renegotiation, this conclusion
still holds with respect to junior creditors. Regardless of the impairment strategy, the renego-
tiation premium to the junior creditor is always negative27. Unlike junior creditors, if senior
claimholders are left unimpaired, by losing their veto power they may lose a valuable outside
option. Therefore, depending on the impairment strategy, the renegotiation premium of senior
creditors may be positive or negative.SEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 17








helps at identifying which factors determine the sign of rps. The term
Min{VL,Fs}−Ps
Fs−S is always
negative and it captures the loss of value28 from liquidating the ﬁrm instead of restructuring
all classes at once. We will refer to this term as to percentage eﬃciency loss. The second term,
Ps−S
Fs−S , as argued in Proposition 5, can be positive or negative depending on the impairment
strategy. When positive, this term captures the additional APV29 as discussed earlier. There-
fore, the renegotiation premium can be positive only if the senior creditor is not impaired
at pt = ¯ p and therefore the additional APV more than oﬀsets the beneﬁts from collective
restructuring.
Our results are summarized in Figure 3, which shows the renegotiation premium rps evalu-
ated at ¯ p and its two components (percentage eﬃciency loss and additional APV) as depending
on bs (which varies from 0 to 0.2 with total coupon payment, bs+bj, constant and equal to 0.2).
Note that, once negative, the renegotiation premium does not continue decreasing when bs in-
creases. This is because the contribution of the eﬃciency loss at reducing the spreads decreases
as more face value is allocated to the senior creditor30. Even though the contribution of the





the impairment strategy reverts and the senior creditor is impaired ﬁrst. From this level of Fs,
the additional APV becomes negative, that is sequential renegotiation reduces APV, and the
renegotiation premium will tend to decrease again31.
A.1. Positive Renegotiation Premia: some empirical ﬁndings and legal issues. Our argument
that Chapter 11 may aggravate APV when senior classes are unimpaired can be of great
relevance in practice. It is quite common that creditors on top of the priority line (senior
secured creditors) are not impaired by a plan and when they are, the impairment involves all
classes (see LoPucki (2004) and LoPucki (1993)). In other words, the impairment structure of
a plan is often in line with the priority structure of claims.
Also, our analysis is consistent with the fact that at times secured unimpaired creditors
undertake legal actions to exit their powerless position of non-voting class. If a claim is ‘actually
unimpaired’, in the sense that there is no loss of value after restructuring, it may be diﬃcult
to justify costly litigation32. In a Chapter 11 proceeding unimpaired creditors often ﬁle a
number of objections to conﬁrmation of a plan and/or motions to convert to Chapter 7 or to
lift (debtor) from automatic stay. Motions and objections to conﬁrmation typically address:
improper classiﬁcation and treatment of classes33 and lack of feasibility of the plan34. Even
though objections by unimpaired creditors are quite common, courts typically hold that a
creditor whose rights are unimpaired under the plan has no right to object to conﬁrmation
(see In re Wonder Corp. of America, Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, case n.70
B.R. 1018, 1023, 1987).
Even though there may be no legal impairment, the default risk of senior/secured debt arises
due to the possibility of further deterioration of the assets value and the need of restructuring
senior/secured classes too. According to the Code, a plan must be feasible in the sense of
not likely to be followed by liquidation or need of further ﬁnancial reorganization (Bankruptcy
Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (a)(11)). However, as repeatedly held by Bankruptcy Courts,
the concept of feasibility simply involves the reasonable prospects of ﬁnancial stability and
success. It is not necessary that success be guaranteed, but only that there may be a reasonable
expectation of success. The mere prospect of ﬁnancial uncertainty cannot defeat conﬁrmation
on feasibility grounds since a guarantee of the future is not required (see In re Drexel Burnham18 BRECCIA
Lambert Group Inc. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, case n. 138 B.R. 723,
1992). Most important, empirical evidence shows that a large number of ﬁrms restructure
their debt a second time. Using a sample of 197 public companies over the period 1979 − 88,
Hotchkiss (1995) ﬁnds that 32% of ﬁrms restructure their debt a second time either in Chapter
11 or in a private workout. Similarly, according to Gilson (1997), almost 25 percent of ﬁrms
ﬁle for bankruptcy or restructure their debts a second time.
It is worth to note that the possibility that an unimpaired senior/secured creditor receives a
value, S, below his collateral, VL, is not ruled out by the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, the
Code restricts the application of what is known as “best interest test” to impaired creditors35
(this test requires that impaired creditors must receive at least what they would receive in
a Chapter 7 liquidation). Therefore, as the best interest test does not apply to unimpaired
classes36 nothing prevents positive renegotiation premia in Chapter 11.
The idea that Chapter 11 rules are particularly disadvantageous to secured creditors is well
recognized by legal scholars. Bebchuck and Fried (1996) argue that Chapter 11 rules tend to
redistribute value from secured to unsecured creditors and to equity holders and that secured
creditors may receive less than what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Also,
the general idea of absolute priority violation in Chapter 11 is supported by several empirical
studies suggesting that junior creditors and equity holders receive non-zero distribution before
secured and/or senior creditors are fully paid. Violation of APR in Chapter 11 reorganizations
has been documented by Weiss (1990), Eberhart et al. (1990), Altman (1991), Fabozzi et al.
(1993), Altman and Eberhart (1994), Franks and Torous (1994). In particular, the possibility
of positive renegotiation premia is in line with Pulvino and Pidot (1997) who ﬁnd that bonds
with very high collateral ratios (which, they argue, in principle, should be immune to default
risk) yield 160 basis points above highly-rated bond yields37.
B. Spread reversals between senior and junior spread
Finally, another interesting implication of our model emerges when comparing the credit
spreads of the senior and the junior creditors, which are calculated as CSs = bs
S − r and
CSj =
bj
J − r respectively. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we show the two spreads, as functions
of bs. In particular, using the same parameters as in Figure 3, in Figure 4 the spreads are
evaluated at diﬀerent level of pt (with pt above, equal and below the restructuring threshold ).
With same baseline parameters, in Figure 5, we show the spreads, still as functions of bs, but
for three diﬀerent level of total face value (with b equal to b1 = 0.25, b2 = 0.30 and b3 = 0.35)
and evaluated at the same level of pt. In both ﬁgures, for high enough level of senior face value
there is reversal between senior and junior spreads.
Interestingly, we are able to derive a simple suﬃcient condition for avoiding reversals for all
levels of the state variable. We do this by comparing the junior spread and the spread of the
senior claim stripped for the scrapping value γ (shortly referred to as senior ‘unsecured’claim).
We start decomposing the senior spread to isolate the eﬀect of the secured part of the claim.

















where ˆ S = S − γ and ˆ Fs = Fs − γ. The two factors in equation (63) can be interpreted as
follows. The ﬁrst term, denoted as
d CSs = r
ˆ Fs − ˆ S
ˆ S
, (64)
represents the credit spread on the senior ‘unsecured’ claim.
The second term, ˆ S/S, captures the eﬀect of the ‘fully-secured’ part of the claim on the
overall credit spread CSs (‘fully-secured’ is used to mean that S can never fall below γ). In
fact, the bigger the fully-secured part of the claim the smaller the ratio ˆ S/S and the spread
CSs.
We can now compare the spreads of the two ‘unsecured’ claims by calculating the diﬀerence
d CSs − CSj, which by some simple algebra yields
d CSs − CSj = r
ˆ FsJ − ˆ SFj
ˆ SJ
. (65)
Proposition 6. The diﬀerence d CSs−CSj is positive if and only if the equilibrium impairment
strategy is {p∗
j2, ¯ p}. d CSs − CSj is negative if and only if the impairment strategy is {p∗
s2, ¯ p}.
The equality holds, and d CSs − CSj = 0 when p∗
j2 = p∗
s2 = ¯ p.
Proof See Appendix. 
Proposition 6 provides a suﬃcient condition for detecting the case where CSs < CSj for any
level of the state variable. In fact, the inequality CSs < CSj rearranges into d CSs ˆ S/S < CSj,
which holds if d CSs < CSj because the term ˆ S/S is always smaller than one.
Last, when the collateral γ tends to zero, our suﬃcient condition becomes also necessary
condition (because, by deﬁnition of d CSs, with γ = 0 then d CSs = CSs). This immediate result
can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. If γ tends to zero, the diﬀerence CSs − CSj is positive if and only if the
impairment strategy is {p∗
j2, ¯ p}. CSs − CSj is negative if and only if the impairment strategy
is {p∗
s2, ¯ p}. When p∗
j2 = p∗
s2 = ¯ p, then CSs − CSj = 0.
In general, low collateral value VL (that is, low α and/or γ) makes reversal of the spreads
more likely because the eﬀective bargaining strength of the senior creditor decreases and that
of the junior increases (with α and/or γ decreasing). The argument runs symmetric to what
argued in Section A. When a senior creditor is impaired ﬁrst, seniority is enforceable, however
there is little value attached to it because the liquidation threat has little scope.
In particular, we are able to identify two circumstances in which the possibility of reversal
is of some practical relevance.
First, in large reorganizations involving more complex priority structures (with at least
four or more classes of debt, such as senior secured, senior unsecured, senior subordinated and
junior), it is often the case that low priority classes, such as senior unsecured (or subordinated)
and junior classes, receive very similar distribution, and seniority provisions do not necessarily
add value to a claim. According to Altman and Eberhart (1994), unlike high priority classes,
lower priority senior-subordinated and subordinated bonds perform very similarly and do very
poorly at emergence from Chapter 11. They ﬁnd an average loss on emergence from Chapter
11 (during the period 1980−92) of 76.4% and 87.4% for senior subordinated and subordinated
bonds respectively. Franks and Torous (1994) ﬁnd that senior unsecured and junior creditors
recover respectively 47% and 28.9% in formal bankruptcy, however in informal restructuring
the recovery increases and reverts to 78.5% for senior unsecured and 79.6% for junior debt38.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to extend the model to account for more complex debt
structures. However, the empirical ﬁnding on recovery in Chapter 11 is in line with our20 BRECCIA
predictions because classes at the bottom of the priority hierarchy may be left with very little
collateral so observing similar or inverted recovery rates between senior and junior spreads
might be more likely.
Second, when the senior creditor is secured as in our setting, for reasonable parameters (as
in Figure 3 where, at the threshold level ¯ p the bankruptcy costs, (V − VL)/V , are just below
25%), then reversal can occur only for a particularly high level of Fs. That is, the reversal
seems to be essentially a reversal between very large claims versus very small unsecured claims.
Reversal would be consistent with the treatment of convenience claims (small unsecured claims,
which for administrative convenience are placed in a separate class) which in Chapter 11
reorganizations are often unimpaired.
Last, one should note that the possibility of spread reversals is not a structural feature of
Chapter 11. Actually, Chapter 11 may reduces the scope of reversals. If the senior creditor
is impaired ﬁrst, from Proposition 5 (see proof) there is a redistribution of value from the
junior creditor (the strong player in this case) to the senior creditor. That is, in this case,
compared to an all-at-once restructuring system, Chapter 11 reduces APV between senior and
junior creditors. Consequently, under a joint-restructuring system reversal might be enhanced
because senior spread should be even higher and junior spread smaller.
VII. Conclusions
The model discussed above provides a framework for a positive analysis of Chapter 11, which
integrates legal and economics features. When restructuring involves multiple creditors, the
equity holders strategically enforce the set of bankruptcy rules which determines a unique
equilibrium restructuring plan.
The current model provides diverse economic implications. When the equity holders can
renegotiate with one creditor at a time, as in Chapter 11, the strategic decision concerns not
only the timing of bankruptcy but also the order in which creditors will be impaired. We ﬁnd
that equity holders impair creditors with a smaller intensity of eﬀective bargaining strength
ﬁrst; that is, the ratio of eﬀective bargaining power to unsecured face value. Depending on the
value of the above ratio, in equilibrium the equity holders will strategically default on a single
class of claims when the state variable reaches a certain trigger level. If the ﬁrm cash ﬂows and
the asset value continue to decrease to a second (lower) trigger level, then the equity holders
will jointly default on both claims.
We ﬁnd that for reasonable parameter values (not excessively high bankruptcy costs and
senior face value relative to junior face value), an equilibrium plan impairs junior classes and
leaves senior classes unimpaired at the ﬁrst (higher) bankruptcy threshold. Senior claimholders
are restructured jointly with junior creditors only if cash ﬂows fall below a lower threshold level.
Interestingly, this kind of equilibrium is consistent with Chapter 11 plans, which commonly
leave senior/secured creditors unimpaired. In this scenario, when senior claimholders are left
unimpaired, by losing their veto power they cannot enforce their seniority. In turn, this furthers
APV and, in particular, the extent of additional APV may lead to positive renegotiation premia
(that is, the senior debt value may fall below its collateral value). The renegotiation premium
increases up to 100% when the collateral (ﬁrm liquidation value) increases. In other words, at
the higher bankruptcy threshold level, even if senior secured creditors should be in principle
immune to default risk because their collateral is high, in practice, as unimpaired class, they
cannot enforce liquidation and seize their collateral. As this scenario is the most common
in reality, a strong violation of the absolute priority rule seems to be a structural feature of
Chapter 11, as well as non-zero default risk in highly secured senior debt.
Moreover, the senior credit spread is not necessarily smaller than the junior one for any
level of the state variable. Whether the spreads may revert or not depends on the impairmentSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 21
strategy. In general, low collateral value and high senior face value (relative to junior claims)
make reversal of the spreads more likely because the senior creditor’s eﬀective bargaining
strength may be smaller than the junior one. In particular, an equilibrium plan, which impairs
the junior creditor ﬁrst, guarantees that the senior spreads is below the junior one for any level
of the state variable.
Our argument that reversal is more likely to occur when the ﬁrm liquidation value is small is
consistent with empirical evidence showing that senior unsecured creditors do not necessarily
recover higher distribution than junior creditors.
Also, because reversal is more likely to occur if junior unsecured face value is particularly low
(compared to senior secured face value), our model is consistent with the treatment convenience
claims, which in Chapter 11 reorganizations are often unimpaired.
Last, single-debt-class restructuring in our model is consistent with the fact that private
workouts are often targeted to single classes of claims, and that cross default provisions do not
prevent a private renegotiation.
Appendix
Proof Π ≥ 0 under an equity holders’ proposal.
If the equity holders impair the junior creditor, the equity holders’ plan belongs to the set
Pj = {Pe,Pj,Ps : Pe ≥ Pe,Pj ≥ Pj,Ps < Ps}. Therefore
Pe ≥ Pe,
can be rearranged (by adding and subtracting V ) into
V − Pe − (V − Pe) ≥ 0.
Replacing V − Pe and V − Pe with Pj + Ps and Pj + Ps gives
Pj + Ps − Pj − Ps ≥ 0.
As Pj = J and Ps = S the above rewrites as Pj +Ps−J −S ≥ 0, which is the deﬁnition of the
arbitrage payoﬀ, Π, therefore one concludes Π ≥ 0. The same conclusion holds if the equity
holders impairs the senior creditor.
Proof Hypothesis 2 holds.
When the optimal strategy is {p∗
j1,p∗
s2}, by substituting for p∗
s2 and p, the inequality Fs >
VL(p∗
s2) rearranges into:
















First, note that the left hand side,
Fs−(1−α)γ
α , is greater than
Fs−(1−αξs)γ
αξs (because αξs > α)
and in turn, one can ﬁnd that
























(which holds being p∗
s2/p > 1 and λ < 0).
(By following the same calculation, just replacing the subscript s with c and p∗
s2 with p∗
c,
one can prove that Hypothesis 2A is satisﬁed, that is: Fc > VL(p∗
c).)22 BRECCIA
Similarly, when the optimal strategy is {p∗
j2,p∗
s1}, the inequality Fs > VL(p∗
s1) rearranges
into:
















which holds because, as shown below, the left hand side of equation (67),
Fs−(1−α)γ




and in turn one can rearrange
























(which holds because p∗
s2/p > 1 and λ < 0). Last, as we claimed,
Fs − (1 − α)γ
α
>
Fs − (1 − αξs,j)γ
αξs,j
because it rearranges as F − γ >
Fjαξs,j
(ξs+ξj)(1−α) which, in turn, holds because by Proposition 2
p∗
s1 is an optimal restructuring threshold if and only if F − γ > Fj
αξs,j
ξj(1−α) .
Proof Propositions 3 and 4.
As argued in Section III, to rule out arbitrage opportunities, the claim values S(pt) and J(pt)
must satisfy the following equations:










Proof Proposition 3. When the optimal strategy is {p∗
s2,p∗
j1}, ﬁrst, one can derive the
service ﬂow function bs(pt) as follows. For pt ≤ p∗
s2, by equation 27, the senior value is S = Ps.
Smooth-pasting conditions are satisﬁed because ps2 minimizes S (and ∂S/∂ps2 = 0 implies
∂S(pt)/∂pt |ps2= ∂Ps(pt)/∂pt |ps2). Substituting for S, S0 and S00 in equation (68) yields
bs(pt) = αξspt + (1 − αξs)γr for pt ≤ p∗
s2
Similarly we can derive bj(pt). For pt ≤ p∗
j1, by equation (30), the junior value is J =
(Ps + Pj − S). Smooth-pasting conditions are satisﬁed because: i) pj1 minimizes J (and this
implies continuity in ﬁrst derivative at pj1) and ii) at ps2 continuity of S in the ﬁrst derivative
also guarantees continuity of J in the ﬁrst derivative (i.e. ∂J(pt)/∂pt |ps2= ∂(Ps(pt)+Pj(pt)−
S(pt))/∂pt |ps2= ∂Pj(pt)/∂pt |ps2). Substituting for J, J0 and J00 in equation (69) delivers
bj(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1 − αξs,j)γr − bs(pt) for pt ≤ p∗
j1
Proof Proposition 4. The proof runs symmetric to the previous one. When the optimal
strategy is {p∗
s1,p∗
j2}, ﬁrst, we derive the service ﬂow function bj(pt). For pt ≤ p∗
j2, by equation
(33), the junior value is J = Pj. Smooth-pasting conditions are satisﬁed because p∗
j2 minimizes
J. Substituting for J, J0 and J00 in equation (69) yields
bj(pt) = ξj(1 − α)(pt − γr) for pt ≤ p∗
j2
Then one can derive bs(pt) as follows. For pt ≤ p∗
s1, by equation (35), the senior value is
S = (Ps+Pj−J). The function S satisﬁes smooth-pasting conditions because i) ps1 minimizes
S at ps1 and ii) continuity of J in the ﬁrst derivative at pj2 guarantees continuity of S in ﬁrstSEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 23
derivative. Substituting for S, S0 and S00 in equation (69) gives
bs(pt) = αξs,jpt + (1 − αξs,j)γr − bj(pt) for pt ≤ p∗
s1
Last, note that under both strategies, S and J satisfy the no-bubble conditions: Ps(p) = γ,
Pj(p) = 0 and limpt→∞ S(pt) = bs












Notice that regardless of the optimal stopping strategy, for low enough level of the state variable
the equity holders impair both creditors jointly. And, when joint renegotiation occurs (i.e.,
pt ∈ [p,p∗
i2]) the value of the junior and senior debt is given by
J = Pj = ξj(V − VL)
S = Ps = ξs(V − VL) + VL.
Substituting for the debt values, Pj and Ps, when pt ∈ [p,p∗
i2], and replacing Fs with F − Fj,





< F − γ.
We have already found this inequality in comparing p∗
i2 and ¯ p and we know that it holds if the
optimal stopping strategy is {p∗
j2, ¯ p} (see Proposition 1). The reverse inequality holds instead
if the optimal stopping strategy is {p∗
s2, ¯ p}. Therefore we conclude that

















i2 = ¯ p}








Left to prove is that the sign of the spread doesn’t revert for pt ∈ (p∗
i2, ¯ p] (we prove this
below, see point (i)) and pt ∈ (¯ p,∞) (see point (ii)).
(i) We prove here that the sign of d CSs − CSj does not revert when pt ∈ (p∗
i2, ¯ p]. To do
this let us compare our ﬁrm with an identical one, say ﬁrm A, which only diﬀers for allocation
of bargaining power amongst creditors, in particular:
ξj > ξAj with ξs + ξj = ξAs + ξAj,
(where the subscript A denotes the creditors’ bargaining powers in ﬁrm A).














which implies (by Proposition 2) that the optimal stopping strategy is to impair both creditors
at ¯ p in ﬁrm A and the senior creditor ﬁrst in the other ﬁrm.
From our assumptions on {ξAj,ξj} and our previous result in equation (71), it follows that















where PAs and PAj correspond to the functions Ps and Pj with bargaining powers ξAs and ξAj
respectively.
By comparing equations (72) and (73), one can easily ﬁnd that
for pt ∈ (p∗










that is, the sign of the spread does not revert. This can be done by rearranging equation (74)
as (PAs + PAj − γ)/PAj > (S + J − γ)/J and noting that: PAs + PAj = Ps + Pj (because
ξs + ξj = ξAs + ξAj by assumption) and Ps + Pj = S + J (by Proposition 1). It follows that
inequality (74) simpliﬁes into J > PAj, which holds because we have assumed that ξj > ξAj.
When the optimal stopping strategy is {p∗
s2, ¯ p}, one can symmetrically repeat the above
argument. Just compare a ﬁrm, which has a stopping strategy {p∗
s2, ¯ p}, with the same bench-
mark ﬁrm A and ξj < ξAj. The rest of the proof runs symmetrically, and can be done by
simply reverting the sign of the inequalities.
(ii) From some straightforward algebra it is immediate to see that the sign of the spread








When the stopping strategy is {p∗
















which is independent of pt. Adding to this result the fact that the diﬀerence of the spread is
continuous at pt = ¯ p, we conclude that d CSs −CSj cannot revert sign in the range pt ∈ (¯ p,∞).
We reach the same conclusion when the stopping strategy is {p∗
s2, ¯ p}, by a similar calculation
one can easily prove that the sign of the spread is independent of the state variable.SEQUENTIAL RESTRUCTURING 25
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Notes
1A creditor is said to be unimpaired if the plan calls for no scaling down of the coupon payment scheduled
in the existing contract.
2Companies emerging from bankruptcy often re-enter Chapter 11 within few years. According to Gilson
(1997), almost 25 percent of ﬁrms ﬁle for bankruptcy or restructure their debts a second time. See also Hotchkiss,
(1995).
3Yet, the 2002 UK Enterprise Act seems to have reduced the power of senior creditors in the event of default.
4This is a standard assumption in cash-ﬂow models for corporate debt valuation. Among others, see Mello
and Parsons (1992), Fries, Miller and Perraudin (1997), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Mella-Barral (1999).
5Risk-aversion can be easily accounted for by using risk-adjusted probabilities as shown by Harrison and
Kreps (1979).
6We do not provide the derivation of the ﬁrm value through the stochastic calculus. We refer the reader to
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a general analysis of entry and exit decisions under uncertainty.
7The new owner receives the ﬁrm value (free of debt) V (pt) and pays the agreed price VL(pt) to the initial
owner.
8Their formulation is VL = αV (in our notation).
9Otherwise, if Fs < γ, the senior claim would be fully secured for any level of the state variable and
renegotiation would involve only the junior unsecured claim.
10See Kordana and Posner (1999) for a critical and exhaustive analysis of Chapter 11’s rules.
11Chapter 11 allows for involuntary bankruptcy too. However, the Court will dismiss a creditors’s bankruptcy
petition if the debtor has not failed to pay its debts when due (Bankruptcy Code, Section 303, Paragraph (h)(1)).
12Bankruptcy Code, Section 1121.
13Bankruptcy Code, Section 1124.
14Bankruptcy Code, Section 1126.
15Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (b)(1).
16In Chapter 11, the exclusive right lasts 120 days (plus 60 days for securing acceptance of the plan) and
can be extended by the Court. The debtors ability to extend the exclusive period has been generally used as
leverage in the negotiating process. Under the 2005 Act, the exclusive period cannot be extended beyond a
maximum of 18 months (Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (d)(2)).
17For instance, Brown (1989) assumes that only a ﬁnite number of proposal is allowed and the bankruptcy
court determines the order in which proposals can be voted. Each proposal might rank ﬁrst, second, or third in
the agenda with same probability.
18As argued by Welch, a bank, unlike bond-holders, can have a good reputation eﬀect for “tough behavior,”
which might prevent other borrowers from opportunistic renegotiation.
19Fan and Sundaresan use the Nash axiomatic approach with asymmetric bargaining power to model strategic
debt service as well as debt/equity swap in a private workout between equity holders and a single class of debt
holders. However, apart from the similarity in the Nash bargaining, their study crucially diﬀers from the current
model.
20See Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) for an extensive analysis of the Nash bargaining solution. We also refer
to Fan and Sundaresan (2000) for a similar characterisation of the Nash bargaining solution. For a more detailed
derivation of the Nash bargaining solution when uncertainty is modeled through a geometric Brownian motion,
see Perraudin and Psillaki (1999).
21Equation (17) is derived by applying Ito’s lemma to rC(pt) = bc(pt) +
d
d4Et(Ct+4) |4=0.
22As argued by Mella-Barral (1999), temporary concessions are much easier to handle compared to irreversible
concessions which instead lead to a path-dependent problems.
23In fact, if p∗ = min{pj,ps} = ps, then by Hypothesis 2 VL(ps) < Fs and therefore, for pt < ps, players’
payoﬀs are given by equations (22)-(24). If p∗ = min{pj,ps} = pj, i.e. pj < ps, being VL(pt) decreasing in
pt, it holds from Hypothesis 2 that VL(pj) < VL(ps) < Fs; therefore, for pt < ps, players’ payoﬀs are given by
equations (22)-(24).
24We denote the optimal trigger by using the subscript ‘in’, with i = s,j and n = 1,2, to stress the order
in which claims are impaired. Therefore, for instance, when the senior creditor is the second claimant to be
impaired we denote the optimal trigger level as ps2 (while when the senior creditor is impaired ﬁrst, the trigger
level is denoted as ps1).
25See equation (15), with αξc = αξs,j. Also, by Proposition 1 the sum of the (sequentially) renegotiated claim
values S + J is equal to Ps + Pj, which is also the total (jointly renegotiated) debt value as argued in Section
III.28 NOTES
26Because the junior creditor is a residual claimant, she purely beneﬁts from receiving a share of the ﬁrm
continuation surplus, V − VL, while the senior creditor, due to the priority of his claim, guarantees the full
liquidation value VL.
27By Hypothesis 2 (see Appendix), if the junior creditor is left unimpaired, his liquidation payoﬀ at pt = ¯ p =
ps1 is equal to Max{(VL − Fs)
+,0} = 0 (because VL(ps1) < Fs). Therefore, as J is positive, the renegotiation
premium to the junior creditor is negative (that is, rpj = −J/(Fj − J) < 0).
28By deﬁnition of Ps (see equation (6)), Min{VL,Fs} − Ps is equal to −ξs(V − VL).
29Note that we have deﬁned the additional APV by using Max{Ps,Fs} rather than Ps because, under the
absolute priority rule no creditor should receive more than his face value unless more junior claimholders have
been fully paid.
30While the credit spread increases with Fs increasing, the share of the going concern surplus, ξs(V − VL)
(which captures the eﬃciency loss), does not depend on face values and remains constant.
31It goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it can be easily proved that the inﬂection point of rps (as in
Figure 3) corresponds to the level of Fs where the two classes are jointly restructured.
32We abstract in our model from information problems related to the continuation surplus and liquidation
value of the ﬁrm. As argued by Bebchuck and Fried (2001), due to uncomplete information on the value of
collateral, diﬀerent (genuine or strategic) estimates of collateral may rise costly and lengthy litigations.
33In re: Mirant Corporation, et al. (Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, case n. 03-46590-DML-11,
2005) the Court denies the motion by a senior creditor (unimpaired and, hence, not entitled to vote), who argues
that the plan actually impairs the Senior Notes and so entitled to vote.
34In re: Tavern Motor Inn Inc. (Bankruptcy Court, District of Vermont, case n. 56 B.R. 446, 1985), an
unimpaired secured creditor ﬁled a motion to convert the case into Chapter 7. The creditor argued the plan
(approved by impaired unsecured creditors) actually impairs his class and is not feasible because there is a
“likelihood of liquidation or further ﬁnancial reorganization”. The motion was denied.
35Bankruptcy Code, Section 1129, Paragraph (a)(7).
36See Seatco, Inc., (Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, case n. 00-37332-BJH-11, 2001) where
“Class 3 creditors are unimpaired under the Plan and the best interest test is not applicable to them”. See
also, Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, House Report (n.95-595) stating “the court may conﬁrm a plan over the
objection of a class of secured claims if the members of that class are unimpaired”.
37Their study uses US Airline secured bond yields and collateral.
38They also ﬁnd that ﬁrms entering Chapter 11 have already attempted to restructure informally and Chapter

















































Figure 1.  Renegotiated debt value with one single creditor.  When renegotiable, the debt value C(pt) 
smooth-pastes the Nash bargaining outcome, Pc, at the threshold level pc which triggers bankruptcy.   
 

















  Figure 2. Debt values and service flow functions when ps<pj , ps=pj, ps>pj. In Panel A, the senior debt, S(pt) is renegotiated first at the trigger level ps.while the junior 
debt, J(pt), is left unimpaired. The senior debt is restructured such that S(pt) smooth-pastes Ps+Pj-J. The junior debt is restructured when the state variable hits the second lower 
trigger level pj where the junior debt smooth-pastes the Nash bargaining share Pj. In Panel B, all debt classes are collectively restructured. The senior and junior debt values 
smooth-paste Ps and Pj respectively and each class guarantees her Nash bargaining outcome. In Panel C, the junior debt, J(pt) is renegotiated when the state variable hits the 
threshold level pj. At this level of pt, the senior debt,  S(pt), is left unimpaired while the junior debt is restructured so that J(pt) smooth-pastes Ps+Pj-S. The senior debt is 
restructured when the state variable hits the second lower trigger level ps and the senior creditor guarantees his Nash bargaining outcome Ps. Panels A1, B1 and C1 show the debt 
service  flow functions corresponding to the equilibrium strategy  depicted in Panel A, B and C respectively. 
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Figure 3. Senior renegotiation premium, APV and Efficiency loss. The renegotiation premium, rps, 
and its components, the additional APV and the efficiency loss, evaluated at  p, are shown as functions 
of the coupon  bs˛[0.1, 0.249]. The total debt face value is held constant with total coupon 
b=bj+bs=0.25, therefore the bankruptcy threshold level  p remains constant. When the senior creditor is 
unimpaired, as in Panel A, the renegotiation premium can be positive or negative. It is positive when the 
additional APV, always positive in this region, more than offsets the benefits from collective 
renegotiation measured by the Efficiency loss. If the senior creditor is impaired, as in Panel B, the 
renegotiation premium is always negative. The vertical line between Panel A and B corresponds to the 
level of bs such that both creditors are jointly impaired and hence the additional APV is equal to zero. 
Baseline parameters are as follows: r=0.06,  µ=0.02,  s =0.15,  e x = s x = j x =1/3 and  g =1 (which 
implies the ratio g /Fs varies from 60% to 24% with bs increasing from 0.1 to 0.249). The parameter a  
is chosen such that the loss of value due to inefficient early liquidation, [V(pt)-VL(pt)]/V(pt), is equal to 
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Figure 4. Senior and junior credit spreads for different level of total face value. The senior and 
junior credit spreads (CSs and CSj), as functions of bs, are evaluated at different levels of total coupon b 
but at the same level of cash flows pt (so they are directly comparable).  The total coupon b takes values: 












     







Senior and junior 
credit spreads         
0.2 




Figure 5. Senior and junior credit spreads evaluated at different level of the cash flow ptt. The 
senior and junior credit spreads (CSs and CSj), as functions of bs, are evaluated at different levels of 
cash flows pt, above, equal or below  p. All parameters are as in Figure 3. 
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